Size Doesn't Matter: Towards a More Inclusive Philosophy of Biology

notes: As the primary author, O’Malley drafted the paper, and gathered and analysed data (scientific papers and talks). Conceptual analysis was conducted by both authors.publication-status: Publishedtypes: ArticlePhilosophers of biology, along with everyone else, generally perceive life to fall into two broad categories, the microbes and macrobes, and then pay most of their attention to the latter. ‘Macrobe’ is the word we propose for larger life forms, and we use it as part of an argument for microbial equality. We suggest that taking more notice of microbes – the dominant life form on the planet, both now and throughout evolutionary history – will transform some of the philosophy of biology’s standard ideas on ontology, evolution, taxonomy and biodiversity. We set out a number of recent developments in microbiology – including biofilm formation, chemotaxis, quorum sensing and gene transfer – that highlight microbial capacities for cooperation and communication and break down conventional thinking that microbes are solely or primarily single-celled organisms. These insights also bring new perspectives to the levels of selection debate, as well as to discussions of the evolution and nature of multicellularity, and to neo-Darwinian understandings of evolutionary mechanisms. We show how these revisions lead to further complications for microbial classification and the philosophies of systematics and biodiversity. Incorporating microbial insights into the philosophy of biology will challenge many of its assumptions, but also give greater scope and depth to its investigations

‘The border problems of science and philosophy’: Ilse Rosenthal-Schneider and post-World War 2 science in Australian academia and society

Ilse Rosenthal-Schneider (1891–1990), a refugee immigrant to Australia in 1938, was a student of Nobel Prize-winning physicists, Einstein, Planck, and von Laue. She combined a background in physics, especially relativity theory, with a philosophical focus on the nature and possibilities of knowledge. As well as working at the University of Sydney to teach science students how to recognise philosophical issues in their subjects, she drove a major outreach programme to regional towns in New South Wales, where she was fêted by her audiences as a highly accomplished science communicator. Her best-known book, published in 1980, examined her interactions with Einstein, Planck, and von Laue by expanding on how all of them understood the relationship between science and philosophy. Rosenthal-Schneider never achieved a great deal of recognition, due in part to the limited opportunities for women of her era, but also due to her insistence on bridging disciplines and engaging in a scientific and philosophical dialogue beyond academia. We will show how Rosenthal-Schneider explored the borderlands of science and philosophy throughout her life, as she argued for the relevance of philosophical questions to practising scientists and non-academic publics in Australia

The roles of integration in molecular systems biology

A common way to think about scientific practice involves classifying it as hypothesis- or data-driven. We argue that although such distinctions might illuminate scientific practice very generally, they are not sufficient to understand the day-to-day dynamics of scientific activity and the development of programmes of research. One aspect of everyday scientific practice that is beginning to gain more attention is integration. This paper outlines what is meant by this term and how it has been discussed from scientific and philosophical points of view. We focus on methodological, data and explanatory integration, and show how they are connected. Then, using some examples from molecular systems biology, we will show how integration works in a range of inquiries to generate surprising insights and even new fields of research. From these examples we try to gain a broader perspective on integration in relation to the contexts of inquiry in which it is implemented. In today’s environment of data-intensive large-scale science, integration has become both a practical and normative requirement with corresponding implications for meta-methodological accounts of scientific practice. We conclude with a discussion of why an understanding of integration and its dynamics is useful for philosophy of science and scientific practice in general

Losing Complexity: The Role of Simplification in Macroevolution

Macroevolutionary patterns can be produced by combinations of diverse and even oppositional dynamics. A growing body of data indicates that secondary simplifications of molecular and cellular structures are common. Some major diversifications in eukaryotes have occurred because of loss and minimalisation; numerous episodes in prokaryote evolution have likewise been driven by the reduction of structure. After examining a range of examples of secondary simplification and its consequences across the tree of life, we address how macroevolutionary explanations might incorporate simplification as well as complexification, and adaptive as well as nonadaptive dynamics.M.A.O.’s research and the ISHPSSB symposium on which this paper is based were funded by a University of Sydney Bridging Support Grant and a University of Bordeaux IdEx Chair of Excellence. J.G.W. is supported by European Molecular Biology Organization ALTF 761-2014, and EMBOCOFUND2012, GA-2012-600394. I.R.T.’s research is supported by ERC-2012-Co-616960, BFU2014-57779-P, and Project 2014 SGR 619.Peer reviewe

A philosophical perspective on evolutionary systems biology

Evolutionary systems biology (ESB) is an emerging hybrid approach that integrates methods, models, and data from evolutionary and systems biology. Drawing on themes that arose at a cross-disciplinary meeting on ESB in 2013, we discuss in detail some of the explanatory friction that arises in the interaction between evolutionary and systems biology. These tensions appear because of different modeling approaches, diverse explanatory aims and strategies, and divergent views about the scope of the evolutionary synthesis. We locate these discussions in the context of long-running philosophical deliberations on explanation, modeling, and theoretical synthesis. We show how many of the issues central to ESB’s progress can be understood as general philosophical problems. The benefits of addressing these philosophical issues feed back into philosophy too, because ESB provides excellent examples of scientific practice for the development of philosophy of science and philosophy of biology